We review the agreements of 483 collaborative research projects between universities and industry. We find that only a subset, 52 of the agreements, allows for the use of trade secrets and lead time advantage, the preferred appropriation mechanisms by industry. We explore this gap by first reviewing the literature on appropriation mechanisms. We explain trade secrets and how lead time advantage is a confused and composite concept. In the empirical part, we use cross-tabulations to study the characteristics of the projects in the subset. We connect how appropriation mechanisms work, with academic secrecy and the theory of incomplete contracts. We conclude with propositions for managers and policymakers on the use of trade secrets in collaborative research.
Introduction
We were surprised when we studied the details in the agreements of 483 research projects between universities and industry. We had access to the agreements between all the parties, including the specifics on how they would share and manage the research results. We knew from the literature that lead time advantages and trade secrets are the most used appropriation mechanisms for innovation; more used than patents or copyright. Then we found that the agreements rarely consider trade secrets at all. We found that around 10% of the agreements had provisions on confidentiality so that the industry partners could use trade secrets in their innovation. However, only 2% had unambiguous contractual clauses that explicitly mentioned trade secrets as a possible appropriation mechanism. Lead time advantage lacks a legal definition and is a confused concept (that we discuss later in the paper). Thus, we did not expect to find any explicit clauses facilitating lead time as an appropriation mechanism. However, we expected to find stipulations in the terms for publication of the research results. If the project participants envisaged that a lead time advantage could be useful in the innovation process, there should be mechanisms for delaying publication, in addition to those needed for patenting. Unexpectedly, we found few projects with terms preparing for lead time advantages in the utilisation of the research results.
The parties in the research collaborations negotiate the agreements before they know the results of the project. Research is a risky business, and we assume that many of the projects we studied did not lead to any innovations. The contracts that the parties make are thus incomplete. The theory that we come back to explains why incomplete contracts should be renegotiated. So, we expected to find clauses in the agreements preparing for changes in the provisions for utilisation of the research. We did not find that. In many ways, this paper discusses what we did not find: The main appropriation mechanisms are not of importance in agreements concerning collaborative research. The contracts fail to prepare for renegotiations. However, we have empirical data of interest: For the around 10% of the projects where secrecy and confidentiality are connected to the utilisation of the research results in innovation processes, we present data on the agreed delay of publication. We also show the use of confidentiality terms for background and research results. (Hong & Walsh, 2009) explore the tension over secrecy between academia and industry. The study shows that there is an increase in secrecy in science for the last 30 years. The increase holds for most industries, and in particular for experimental biology. They underline that there is a complex entrepreneurial relationship between industry and academia. (Czarnitzki, Grimpe, & Toole, 2015) have similar finding their study of German scientists, in that they show that industry sponsorship of research, reduces the public disclosure of the results. (Biagioli, 2012) discusses "secrecy, openness and priority in science". His point is that secrecy within academia is risk aversion related to claims of priority. Scientists must publish to establish priority, that they were the first behind the new knowledge. By keeping their research secret, they reduce the risk of others publishing before them. The risk reduction applies to all systems of priority, including the patent system, the system of scientific peer-reviewed journals and selfpublishing in open depositories. (Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005, pp. 936, 946 ) expand on what they call the "secrecy problem". They conclude that there are more collaborations, more publications and more entrepreneurial results from professors with industrial funding. Thus, it seems here that possible requirements for secrecy from industry does not lead to less academic publishing. The broad literature review of academic engagement in commercialisation by (Perkmann et al., 2013) shows that there is no conclusive evidence that industry exposure for researchers leads to increased secrecy and less academic publications.
Our research goal is to empirically examine how parties in university-industry collaborative research foresee the use of and agree on the related appropriation mechanisms trade secrets and lead time advantage, given the contracts being incomplete. Our research results give new insight into how universities and industry agree on the appropriation of innovation. Research and innovation managers in universities and firms can use the insight to create better agreements that encompass realistic, renegotiable terms for appropriation mechanisms.
We begin with reviewing the literature on appropriation mechanisms. We then explain trade secrets and lead time advantage before the empirical part of our study. Here we present our data, how we coded the collaboration agreements and then the results in the form of cross tabulations. Our discussion is extensive and conceptual because we connect how appropriation mechanisms work, with academic secrecy and the theory of incomplete contracts. We then give directions for further research, before we conclude with four propositions for managers and policymakers on the use of trade secrets in collaborative research.
2 Related literature
Appropriation mechanisms
Appropriability is a core concept in innovation research. (Sun & Zhai, 2018) show the evolution of appropriability research between 1986 and 2016. They point to three areas where the debate is now: Platform governance, generative appropriability and how to select mechanisms that connect to business strategy. They present a basic framework for appropriability research. In this framework, the operation of the mechanism includes how it affects the firm's strategic decisions. The design of the mechanism and the operation is a separate field of research from the essential attributes of appropriation. These attributes include threshold and duality effects. The threshold is the fundamental attribute of changing the ownership and control of the technology. The concepts of appropriability of innovation" and "appropriation mechanisms" developed in the late 50ies and early 60ies, for example in (Arrow, 1962) . The background is referred to and discussed by (Von Hippel, 1982, pp. 95,107) discuss the development and lists three mechanisms for appropriation: Patents, Trade secrets and Response time (a part of the "lead time" concept we discuss below). In the framework from (Sun & Zhai, 2018 fig. 9 ) the other essential attribute that the literature study is "dual face". This term explains how appropriation has two effects working together: control and dissemination. As an example, (De Rassenfosse, Palangkaraya, & Webster, 2016 ) discuss this duality for patented technology when traded. They discuss how ownership influences the outcome of the negotiations, compared to the disclosure of the technology. Details of the technology are published through the patent system. That a patent discloses the technology makes the contract more complete. The duality is also there for trade secrets. The obvious use of a secret is to keep ownership and control. However, firms use trade secrets in knowledge exchange. On a macro level, there is a positive association between the stringency of trade secrets protection and key indicators of innovation and international economic flows. OECD, 2015) . For a firm or research organisation secrecy is a part of their organisational communication, internally and with other organisations (Costas & Grey, 2014; Fan, Costas, & Grey, 2017; Hilgartner, 2012) .
Researchers describe a multitude of appropriation mechanisms. (Teece, 1986 Fig. 3 ) discusses regimes of appropriability with two essential dimensions: The nature of the technology (product, process, tacit, codified) and the legal instruments (patents, copyrights, trade secrets). Lead time is only mentioned as part of how the innovator and imitator will position themselves (Teece, 1986, p. 297) . In (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000, p. 8) there are not five or six distinctive mechanisms, but three strategies that can be combined: Complementary capabilities and lead time, legal mechanisms (notably patents) and secrecy. Their survey shows how lead time, secrecy and patents are seen as an effective mechanism for product innovations. For process innovations secrecy is the dominant mechanism (Cohen et al., 2000 figures 1-4) (Arundel, 2001, pp. 621-622 fig. 1 ). The ranking is consistent with (Eurostat, 2016) . Secrecy is here established as a more efficient way of appropriation than patents, copyright and trademarks. In general, the literature agrees that secrecy is a more important appropriation mechanism than patents and trademarks. A point made by (Cohen et al., 2000) is that there are not separate mechanisms, but rather strategies. This point is further explored by (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, 2007, p. 107) when they link empirical data with a model for appropriability strategy. They conclude that "drawing lines between different appropriability mechanisms is challenging, because they interact and could be classified in many different ways". Firms in most industries will use a multitude of appropriation mechanisms for the same invention. Patents complement secrecy, and copyright and trademarks are "far more widely used" (Hall, Helmers, Rogers, & Sena, 2014, p. 419 ).
There is a thorough review of the appropriation mechanisms discussed in the literature ten years ago in (Lopez, 2009, pp. 20-21) . The Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat, 2018, pp. 113-115) has a normative list of appropriation mechanisms to be used in research and for statistics such as the Community Innovation Studies. The selection and division of appropriation mechanisms have evolved for each edition. These amendments demonstrate a point that (Sun & Zhai, 2018, p. 226 ) makes: The research field and the terms evolve. There are now many new concepts discussed as appropriation mechanisms. The examples below are not exhaustive and include only those that are composites and typically relate to trade secrets or lead time advantage. As we study how the contracts use appropriation mechanisms, it is of interest that the contracts themselves can be regarded as such a mechanism: -Human Resources Management (HRM): HRM comprises employment contracts, restrictions on employee mobility and communication. "Tacitness" interacts with "secrecy" and other appropriation mechanisms (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, 2007) . (Thomä & Zimmermann, 2013) point to the complementarity observed between employee retention and lead time advantages. Long-term retention of employees is more important than lead time advantages and secrecy. Their findings are consistent with the earlier ones of (Blind, Edler, Frietsch, & Schmoch, 2006) . -Labour legislation is in (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, 2007) discussed as a mechanism. It is partly overlapping with HRM and includes employment contracts, employee non-competes and also legislation on employment inventions (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, 2007, p. 97) . The mobility of the workforce can be restricted by "non-compete clauses" in the employment agreements. Protecting trade secrets is often an important issue in such agreements, as is the balance with the employers right to whatever skills and knowledge they have acquired. "..mobility restriction mechanisms affect appropriability through their impact on secrecy and lead time" is a conclusion in (Delerue & Lejeune, 2010 ). -Contracts: are discussed by (Hall et al., 2014, pp. 98-99) , partly as an underlying mechanism for the management of secrecy. In a survey of 100 European firms, the literature on contracts as an appropriation mechanism is reviewed (Hagedoorn & Zobel, 2015) . Contractual appropriation mechanisms, in particular, given open innovation and utilisation of academic research is discussed in (Petrusson, Rosén, & Thornblad, 2010) and in (Petrusson, 2016, pp. 345-347) . Trade secrets are often regulated by contracts. The contract may, for example, define who has access to the secret under what terms and for how long the secret will be kept. -Branding, marketing and advertising: (Ho, Keh, & Ong, 2005) connect advertising to marketing and branding, and then to how brand names build barriers for competitors (Ho et al., 2005, p. 4) . Branding relates to the even broader term "lead time advantages" and would then include the use of trademarks, or a composite of trademarks, copyright, designs and the reputation that patents give. Secrets contribute to branding and marketing (D. Hannah, Parent, Pitt, & Berthon, 2014 ). -Publication, disclosure: Disclosure or publishing is a variant of the combinations of patenting and secrecy (Graham, 2004) . Publication or strategic disclosure of an invention will make it impossible for others to patent the same or a similar invention. Publication and disclosure then become part of a continuum with secrecy and "tacitness". -Modularity, segmentation: Modularity can be used "... to disperse and hide information that might otherwise be difficult to protect through the legal system." (Baldwin & Henkel, 2015) . The mechanism is close to "complexity of design", though the point here is not complexity, but how technological and organisational modules can be used. (Gooris & Peeters, 2016) build on this modularity: IT-enabled integration of business processes makes it possible to use modularity and avoid misappropriation. Writing from a legal point of view, (Villasenor, 2015) uses the same argument and calls it "segmentation. Modularity is used to keep trade secrets and reduce the risk of misappropriation. -Certifications and standards: There are historical and current examples in (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006 , p. 1204 . The guarantee for quality that is discussed is closely related to the primary function of trademarks. Patents and patent pools interact with technology standards, and this affects firms' appropriation of innovation (Fischer & Henkel, 2013, p. 327; Heiden, 2017, p. 19; Vakili, 2016) . Now, with this as a background, before we turn to our study concerning collaborative research, we need to look closer at trade secrets and lead time as appropriation mechanisms of use in an early stage of innovation. Many of the newly described appropriation mechanisms above are aimed at appropriation in a later stage of the innovation process but relate to these two concepts that must be in place from an early stage. In a framework for university-industry collaboration, our paper concerns the Formation Phase (Ankrah & Al-Tabbaa, 2015 Fig. 1 ). For a complete innovation process, we study the very beginning, where it may be more relevant to discuss and measure the impact of university-industry collaboration, rather than appropriability (Perkmann, Neely, & Walsh, 2011; Perkmann et al., 2013) . However, we see a continuum from publication to secrecy and a connection to the concept of lead time advantage, that we present in the next sections.
Trade secrets explained
The terms" trade secret" and "secrecy" are often used interchangeably. In legal terminology, information that is kept confidential to preserve competitive gains is referred to as "trade secrets", "undisclosed information", "business confidential information" or "secret know-how". Business and academia sometimes use other name tags for it such as "proprietary know-how" or "proprietary technology" (European Commission, 2013a, p. 2). Most legal definitions of "trade secret" include four concepts: i) it is business-related technical or commercial information ii) it must not be known to the public iii) it must have value for business from being kept as a secret, and iv) there must be a reasonable effort to protect the trade secret from disclosure.
Trade secrets are used for all innovation types: Product (including services), Process, Marketing and Organisational innovations. Trade secrets are often compared to patents as an alternative for appropriating product or process innovations (EUIPO, 2017; Graham, 2004) . Most of the literature discuss trade secrets in view of these two innovations types, but the use of trade secrets is evident also in marketing innovations (D. Hannah et al., 2014; David R. Hannah, McCarthy, & Kietzmann, 2015) and for organisational innovations (Costas & Grey, 2016; Liebeskind, 1997) .
Secrets are managed by the innovative firm, for example by using "Non-Disclosure Agreements" and defined work procedures. However, there are risks from misappropriation, such as cyber-criminality and employees leaving and then revealing the secrets to a new employer (D. R. Hannah, 2005; Robertson, Hannah, & Lautsch, 2015) . Like other forms of intellectual property, trade secrets are also something that can be sold and licensed. They can be a part of licensing in open innovation and other trade arrangements. This aspect of commerce and innovation is where the USA and EU now will be excelling: Their new, harmonised legislation on trade secrets, facilitates the improved exchange of knowledge in the form of trade secrets. Other countries' legislation does this as well, but the harmonised laws will give more assurance and trust among firms and facilitate cross-border knowledge exchange (Caenegem, 2014 §9.05 ).
The importance of trade secrets for appropriating innovation has always been apparent for business managers and researchers. It is reflected in most countries' legal systems, and there are numerous examples of case law and economic considerations concerning trade secrets (Rønde, 2001; Searle, 2010) . The current research on trade secrets in jurisprudence and economics is reviewed in OECD and EU reports (European Commission, 2013b; . They document the economic importance thoroughly. Studies by the European Commission have a recent review of trade secrets usage from an economic and legal perspective, including both European and US research (European Commission, 2013b) , and there is a recent review of the legal status in the member states (EUIPO, 2018).
There is an EU directive on trade secrets (European Commission, 2016) . The USA has had a similar process of legal harmonisation with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, followed by the Economic Espionage Act and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016. These laws together with international trade agreements build an evolving legal framework for trade secrets. However, the legal framework may not be pivotal to the extent organisations use trade secrets, but rather the institutional environment and informal aspects ().
A number of studies, including (Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 2000; Eurostat, 2016; Gallié & Legros, 2012; Hall et al., 2014; Leiponen & Byma, 2009; Levin et al., 1987) show that business managers find that lead time and trade secrets are among the most important or effective appropriation mechanisms, more important than trademarks, patents, copyright, and designs. Similar results from surveys in the USA are discussed in (OECD, 2015, p. 31): Trade secrets and trademarks are together with copyright perceived as more important than patents by most business managers.
There is one area where trade secrets are very different from other appropriation mechanisms: If they are published, they can no longer be used for appropriation. No other innovation appropriation mechanism is lost, if the knowledge it appropriates is published. Therefore, we look at trade secrets as early as in research projects. Later new product or service development may depend on the appropriation of the research results. The utilisation of the research may depend on trade secrets. Sometimes the trade secret does not have to last for a long time. The secret may be part of lead time advantage, that we discuss next.
2.3
The confusion around lead time advantage "Lead time advantage" is an ambiguous term. As a concept for product or service innovation, it means "the advantage of being early in the market with a new product or service and keeping the competitors away by that" (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, 2007; Von Hippel, 1982, p. 109) . The term is close to but not the same as "first mover advantage" (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988 and "barriers of entry" (Demsetz, 1982) . However, in process innovation, having an operational innovation view, or regarding "total quality management" or "lean processes" it could mean "the advantage from having short time from custom order to delivery" (Krajewski, Ritzman, & Malhotra, 2013, pp. 29,42) .
We find three distinct types of time advantages referred to in the literature. The intuitive one is in Figure  1 , below. With a late market launch, possible sales are lost. Later sales may also be lost from being shorter in the market than planned. Total lost sales are theoretical considerations versus budgeted or planned sales from an earlier launch. There are two concepts here. The first is that the delayed income will delay the profit of the firm. Even if there are no competitors, being late in the market means lower profit that income year, and perhaps also the coming years. Then, there is the effect of competitors, where early launch may lead to a larger market share, as shown in Figure 2 . Here "first mover advantage" means that imitators will have a lower market share. Product A is copied by B and C. However, A keeps a high market share because the market tends to prefer the first entrant. A lower market share does not necessarily mean a lower profit. There may also be a disadvantage of being first that is discussed below. In Figure 3 product A is launched, and B and C wish to copy it. They react after a "response time", discussed below. However, they cannot copy A, because of trade secrets or the risk of patent infringement. B and C remain in the R&D lab, and A enjoys a lead time advantage with a 100% market share, being a unique product until the secret is revealed or the patent term expires -or a substitute product is developed. When managers are asked about their use of appropriation mechanisms in surveys with questions using the term "lead time advantage", it is not clear which of the three concepts in the figures above they consider. There may also be an ambiguity from innovation type and differences between languages. (Von Hippel, 1982, p. 110 and fn. 16 ) introduce as an additional term of "response time" and how it is different from "lead time". Response time is the time the competitors use to understand the new opportunity and develop a similar product. Lead time includes the response time, and the extra time from the benefits of patents, trade secrets or "other means such as adopting pricing strategies designed to forestall imitation". From this, it is clear that von Hippel considers "lead time" to be composed of more than the advantage of being first, the "first mover advantage" or "market pioneer advantage" as used by (Robinson & Fornell, 1985) . Their empirical study showed that there is an advantage of being the first on the market. The study includes the use of patents and trade secrets. Only 20% of the market pioneers they studied benefited from patents or trade secrets, and they did not perform significantly better than the market pioneers without patents or trade secrets. The study is not conclusive but points again to how "lead time" is related to other mechanisms.
For incremental innovations, where patent protection may not be possible, there is an argument in (Reichman, 2000 (Reichman, , p. 1747 ) that lead time advantages is what is expected from "actual or legal secrecy". This argument is further discussed by (Bjørnstad, 2016) writing about Plant Breeders' Rights (PBR). He points to new plant varieties having a biological lead time advantage of around ten years, where it is hard for competing breeders to create a similar variety. PBR then work by extending that lead time.
There are different, overlapping concepts around being first and the relation to innovation, appropriation mechanisms, competitive advantage and profitability. "Time to market", "lead time advantages", "first mover advantage" or "market pioneer advantage" are frequently used empiric terms. The literature offers no conclusions about the nature of the advantage or how those advantages relate to other concepts such as innovation appropriation mechanisms, competitive advantage and profitability. A literature review shows that there are industry differences (Gómez-Villanueva & Ramírez-Solís, 2013). There is a first-mover disadvantage for consumer goods in mature industries. For consumer goods with high sales, there is a first mover advantage. There is even a rule of thumb relationship of the relative market share for the imitators being one divided by the square root of the order of entry.
As discussed above, in the view of von Hippel and others, trade secrets are an important part of the composition of "lead time advantages". We have now presented how lead time advantage is a confused and composite appropriation mechanism and how there is a continuum with trade secrets. Further, the continuum with "publication" is apparent: When the research results are published, lead time advantage can be lost.
3 Empirical study
Data, samples and tools
We used a semi-random sample of 483 collaborative research projects funded by the Research Council of Norway (RCN) between 2008 and 2017. We selected projects that had at least one university and one industry partner, and that belonged to a technology research programme. We made a random selection of 1000 projects. We then dismissed projects that were not collaborative and where appropriability and innovation were not issues, such as support to conferences. Recommended by the RCN, the Norwegian Ministry of Education permitted us to study the agreements between the parties in the projects. Norwegian law allows researchers access to such material under strict confidentiality. The RCN archives not only the sponsor contract between the project coordinator and the RCN but also the agreements between the parties. These agreements must follow RCN's permissive policy on Intellectual Property (IP), but the negotiations are not monitored or checked by the RCN. Thus, the parties freely negotiate their agreements. There are templates available, but they are not mandatory (The Research Council of Norway, 2008 Norway, , 2015 . Many agreements could not be retrieved from the RCN's data-based archive for unknown reasons. Others were impossible to read due to scanning errors or incomplete. We found no systematic errors and decided to use only the readable, complete agreements. We then had 3937 agreements from 483 projects. We checked that the projects with non-retrievable agreements had similar characteristics with the retrieved ones, in terms of budget, number of partners and field of technology. We concluded that our set is representative.
The agreements were all scanned pdf-documents, as images and not with characters embedded. We read all and recorded our scores and comments in Excel. We transferred a subset, discussed below, to a Nvivo 12 database for qualitative analysis.
Attributes, measures and coding
For each of the 483 projects, we recorded publicly available data, such as the start and end dates, the number and types of partners, the budget, the public funding and the project coordinator.
In addition to the publicly available data on each project, we also recorded, as we read the agreements, if they were bilateral or consortium agreements, and if an RCN template was used.
A major part, 35% of the projects we studied are defined as "innovation projects", 33% are "competence building" projects where the primary purpose is to create knowledge of skills that are useful for innovation, education or further research. The rest of the projects we studied include basic research, special projects or PhD-programmes. We had the RCN's classification, and we then aggregated these into innovation, competence building and other projects.
We reviewed the description of each project together with the research programme it belonged to. Based on that we coded each project's field of technology to be one of: BIO (all life sciences), ENERGY (petroleum, wind, solar, hydro-electricity), ENGINEERING (mechanics, material sciences, manufacturing), ICT (information technology, communication technology, artificial intelligence), OCEAN (aquaculture, shipping, non-energy, generic subsea), OTHERS (such as ecosystems, climate research and transport systems).
We then coded each project on Confidentiality and Publication. Confidentiality is the right that parties to the research collaboration agreement have to require confidentiality on the research results or project background from the other parties. Publication is the right each party has to publish the research results or project background from the other parties. We read the contractual clauses and scored each project according to We based the table on typical contractual clauses in the agreements and from templates such as DESCA and the Lambert toolkit (DESCA, 2017; Eggington, Osborn, & Kaplan, 2013) . Score 3 indicates a normal score where there is a balance between the rights to publish and the right to keep the background and the results as trade secrets. The steering committee of the project has a role in overseeing that planned publications do not interfere with the planned use of appropriation mechanisms, such as patents. With a score of 3, a trade secret is limited in time. With a score of 1, all results and background can be kept as trade secrets. There are no requirements for publication. RCN's policy document requires that research results are published. The clauses in the agreements, however, give one or more parties control over what is to be published. In this way, general results may be published, whereas the workings or key details may be left out. With a score of 5, there are no requirements for confidentiality, not even for the background knowledge that the parties bring into the project when it starts. All results can and will be published. This hinders the use of trade secrets as an appropriation mechanism. Lead time advantage will be limited to the response time, the time it takes for others to read the results and act on them.
We then selected a subset of the 483 projects where either the Confidentiality or Publication was "1 Restricted knowledge flow", or where we found the trade secret or university legislation clauses. We reasoned that these projects are the ones where trade secrets could be the appropriation mechanism and where lead time advantage could be used. We also added to the set projects where we found contractual clauses that in clear text specified that results could be trade secrets (or similar terms).
This subset has 52 projects. We then studied the agreements again for each of these projects. We looked at the balance between publication and confidentiality, and for other related clauses and coded with the following codes
Code Description

Background forever
The background information the parties bring into the project can be kept as a trade secret forever.
Background medium The background information the parties bring into the project can be kept as a trade secret for a limited number of years, such as five years.
Inconsistent
The clauses on publication and confidentiality are inconsistent. For example, could publication of all results be required within one year, but the industry partner could require results to be trade secrets indefinitely.
National security The secrecy requirements are not for the appropriation of the innovation but due to military requirements or the security of national infrastructures, such as the power grid.
PhD
The requirements for publication are connected to the results being part of a PhD-thesis.
Results forever
The research results can be kept as a trade secret forever.
Results medium to long
The research results can be kept as a trade secret for three to ten years.
Results short
The research results can be kept as a trade secret for half a year to two years. This period is typically used for trade secrets that will be part of a patent application.
Results unclear
There are some provisions for keeping the research results secret, but no definite time or mechanism is defined.
Trade secrets or secrecy
We confirmed the prior coding -the use of trade secrets as an appropriation mechanism is anticipated in the agreement.
University clause
We confirmed the prior coding -the university refers to the publishing of the results being a legal requirement that they can only dispense from for half a year to one year. 
Empirical results
Initially, we note that the subset with restricted knowledge flow is around 11% of the total number of projects we reviewed. We have categorical data and use cross tabulation. First, we look at the distribution between fields of technology in Table 3 .
Table 3 Counts of Technology Areas
The distribution of the selection is like the distribution for the complete set. We see that the energy field is overrepresented, and the biotechnology field is lower. We found that 58% of the agreements were based on RCN's templates; in the selection, 52% use the RCN templates. We did not record the use of other templates such as DESCA.
We note that there are few projects in each technology field, with 23 in energy and only three in the engineering field. We then turn to the coding we did for the projects in the subset, in Table 4 . "Others" has too few projects for commenting and is diverse. In the engineering field, two out of the three projects are projects we tagged for being explicit on trade secrets and for all the projects the results and background can be kept secret forever. One of the agreements is inconsistent, meaning that it allows for eternal secrecy and gives the university the right to publish.
The energy field has a higher percentage of background knowledge that can be kept secret forever. In this field more of the agreements allow for keeping the results secret, but there are differences in the time they can be kept. The ocean and bio sectors are similar. There are differences in the time results can be kept secrets. For some projects, the background can be disclosed. There are only four ICT projects in the subset. In three of these, there were explicit contractual clauses on trade secrets, combined with a clause where a university partner says results must be published. We still consider that these trade projects can use trade secrets, and thus keep a lead time advantage. Below we discuss this combination of secrecy and publication requirements, that we do not consider inconsistent.
We then turn to the cross tabulation for the two types of projects "innovation" and "competence" in Table 5 . There is a clear difference between the competence and the innovation projects: A higher share of the innovation projects can keep the background and results secret. The "result short" coding has the same share, pointing to patenting being possible to the same extent. Explicit clauses on trade secrets are more prominent among innovation projects.
Discussion
Selecting appropriation mechanisms in an early stage of collaborative research
We started our paper by sharing our surprise when we found that only 52 out of 483 collaborative research projects had contractual clauses that allowed for trade secrets as an appropriation mechanism.
Most of the 483 projects have provisions that allow patenting. The Norwegian law on employees' inventions (Norwegian Parliament, 1970) gives the employer, including universities, the right to apply for a patent. Thus, the contract templates used during negotiations between the project parties cater for this. Typical terms will be that planned publications that comprise inventions or that may hinder patent applications by making them obvious, can be delayed for a month or two. The 13 projects we coded with "results short" have such provisions, but so have most of the 483 projects, either from the agreements or Norwegian background law.
The ambiguous and confused appropriation mechanism of "lead time advantage" may comprise patents and patent applications. A published patent application is a risk for competitors, as the claims of a granted patents can be valid from the publication of the application. Patenting that provides a lead time advantage when the application is published, is well suited for research collaborations. The research results are published; appropriation is possible if the patent is granted. Patent prosecution can take a long time, as can innovation beginning with a research project. The possibility of building a portfolio of appropriation mechanisms is there. There is an empirically based overview in (Henttonen, HurmelinnaLaukkanen, & Ritala, 2016 table 4) of mechanisms for appropriability in connection with R&D collaborations. Here secrecy and lead time are not noticeable mechanisms in collaboration between firms and publicly funded research organisations, whereas patents are. Also, secrecy is important in the firms R&D collaboration with suppliers. In our study we do not have this dimension: In the collaborative research projects we studied, there may be both suppliers and users of technology together with universities and research institutes. (Petrusson, 2016, pp. 344-346) points to how trade secrets are problematic for universities. The context is that the universities must take responsibility for the utilisation of the research. Trade secrets are then one of the possible methods to control how the new knowledge is transferred between the parties in the collaborations. For example, in Table 4 we see that the ICT projects in our selection use trade secrets. Typically the appropriation mechanisms for software that is not open source is copyright in combination with keeping the source code secret. (Petrusson, 2016) discusses how an academic institution can promote utilisation in different ways, or logics. A prerequisite is that the knowledge assets can be identified, described and are possible to transfer. Thus, intellectual property is needed if the academic institution wishes to be in control. None of the collaboration agreements we studied, or the templates that we have reviewed, connect a planned utilisation with the choice of appropriation mechanisms. The agreements are not clear on the scope of possible utilisation; the logic to be used for utilisation of the research results is not identified. The contractual clauses are consequently not adapted to the appropriability logic. (Stevens, Van Overwalle, Van Looy, & Huys, 2016) divide early-phase research in public-private partnerships into three types: Partnership focused, Hybrid and Open Collaboration. They show how these differ in terms of variations in intellectual property rights to background and results as we have in Table 4 and Table 5 . They conclude that no single intellectual property framework applies to every partnership in early-phase research. From Table 5 we show a difference between innovation and competence projects. The templates that RCN provides for these project types are the same, even if their scope -competence building or innovation -differs. In all the projects in our study, one or more universities participate.
On the one hand, we were surprised to find so few projects with trade secrets as a clear appropriation mechanism. On the other hand, we should be just as surprised that we found anyone at all, considering the universities normative resistance to secrecy. We discuss this in the next clause.
Academic secrecy
When we consider the norms in academia, perhaps we should have been less surprised that few of the agreements in our study allow for trade secrets as an appropriation mechanism. (Perkmann et al., 2013, p. 433 ) discuss how academic science is diverse and how the Mertonian norms, for our discussion, in particular, the norm of "communism" where secrecy is the antithesis (Merton, 1973, pp. 273-275) , cannot be used as a discreet characterisation of all academic institutions. So, there are two types of secrecy in academia, both seen by Merton as the antithesis of scientific norms: Academic secrecy that follows from the scientific competition, and trade secrets, often in the form of results from collaborative research with industry. (Czarnitzki, Grimpe, & Pellens, 2015; Walsh & Huang, 2014) show empirically how collaboration with industry affects a large percentage (30-50%) in withholding research results. We have not found any studies on the prominence of the pure academic secrecy, however (Nelson, 2016) provides and insightful qualitative study on how academic sharing and secrecy is managed. Here sharing is a much broader concept than publication and include sharing in workshops and laboratory visits. The researchers manage the tension between sharing and secrecy in four ways: leveraging trust, strategic withholding, delaying and patenting. Our study is less detailed in that it looks at what is agreed in contracts, and not the actual management of the collaborations.
An interesting economic model for the balance between secrecy and Open Science is in (Mukherjee & Stern, 2009) . A result of our study is in Table 4 and Table 5 on the University clause. Around 40% of the projects in our subset, i.e. projects with restricted knowledge flow, still have a clause that says the universities due to legal requirements must publish. In most of the agreements, this duality is left unsolved. In a few contracts the conflict jumps out of the text, as shown in Figure 4 . The underlined sentence is added to the cut-and-paste clause, probably by an industrial partner. The sentence before shows the inherent conflict between two sets of law: Publication must take place, because the university law says so, but only if there is no other law saying otherwise. In Norway, those other laws are merely the provisions in the marketing law and the penalty code on trade secrets. In other words, Norwegian jurisprudence support that trade secrets will trump requirements for publication (Irgens-Jensen, 2010, pp. 54-55) . We do not think it is a good idea to enforce secrecy upon unwilling university researchers when the industry partners figure out that appropriability can only be ensured by trade secrets. In our conclusion, we propose how to manage this situation. However, this tension leads to the next discussion: When the collaboration agreements are negotiated, the parties lack information about the results. The contracts are incomplete and should be renegotiated. 
Incomplete contracts
We have analysed the outcome of free negotiations between university and industry partners. We have studied 3937 completed and signed contracts. However, in terms of economic theory, all of these contracts are incomplete. (Hart & Moore, 1988, p. 756) point to both lack of or asymmetry in information together with transactions costs as what makes contracts incomplete. Their model shows that the outcome should be renegotiations of the contract. For the 483 projects in our study, the parties lack information on the results of the project; this is simply by the definition of a research project. Also, the parties will try to reduce transaction costs. The reduction is implied by the high percentage that uses the RCN templates, well above half of the agreements. Other templates are used, as well. The templates reduce transaction costs, at the price of incompleteness. However, we did not find that any of the agreements had good provisions for renegotiations. That is, the agreements could have specified that the parties should renegotiate within certain frames when they knew more about the results and the possible utilisation of the research results. (Aghion & Tirole, 1994 , pp. 1192 ,1201 propose that ownership is determined by the underinvestment by both parties and ex-ante bargaining power. They further propose that ownership should be split between the parties according to comparative advantage in creating value. (Lerner & Merges, 1998) explore this further in an empirical study of alliances between biotechnology firms. The critical role that "control rights" have in commercialisation points to our question of how possible trade secrets and lead time advantages are managed in R&D. (Rosenkranz & Schmitz, 2003) introduce a model for allocation of ownership rights in dynamic collaborations building on the same ideas of incomplete contracts. This line of literature does not discuss how appropriability is a prerequisite for ownership. When we apply the perspective from the theory of incomplete contracts on the question of appropriation mechanisms, we see that there are theoretical considerations for who ex-ante should be in control or the technology and that this control should be renegotiated.
Directions for further research
In our subset of 52 projects, we have restrictive clauses on publication and confidentiality. We studied the clauses regulating appropriation through trade secrets and lead time advantages. However, we did not analyse the relationship with ownership. Further studies could see how the parties distribute ownership given the theory of incomplete contracts. Also, as the templates affect the transaction cost, and theory says that incomplete contracts should be renegotiated, further studies could investigate if such renegotiated contracts exist, and how they differ. Another area for study is how templates that prepare for renegotiation could be formed and managed.
As secrets are rarely measured -the role they have in research impact is not well understood. One aspect is the role that trade secrets have in knowledge transfer, such as in licensing. This role can be seen in the view of the questions asked in (Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007) . They discuss science in terms of supply and demand, and they ask how to enhance the public value from public science. The societal use of research results is, of course, broader than the commercial utilisation alone. Trade secrets' role is by its definition limited to trade and commerce. Then a simple view can be that if the user can only benefit from the research results if they are kept secret, then the research results should be managed as trade secrets by their "missed opportunity matrix" (Sarewitz & Pielke, 2007, p. 12, fig. 1 ). In terms of research portfolios and how policy affects the choice between them, the need for secrecy and industrial collaboration should then not be a negative factor.
Another issue that is important for the understanding of the impact is reproducibility. (Jasny et al., 2017) point to the need for research to be reproducible to have an impact. They present a list of issues that must be explicitly agreed between the parties in industry-academia partnerships. Access to the research data itself is necessary. They point to how even scientific journals have agreed not to make the complete dataset available for other researchers (Jasny et al., 2017, p. 761) . If the agreements between industry and universities do not address reproducibility when agreeing on secrecy, it will mean that impact measures based on publication data will be wrong, as the publicly available research is assumed to be reproducible. When we designed our study, we did not consider reproducibility as a topic. We know that it is not an explicit issue in the agreement templates (DESCA, 2017; The Research Council of Norway, 2015) . How the universities can ensure reproducibility in view on confidentiality clauses, is a central question for Open Science and needs further studies. (Sohn & Lee, 2012, p. 545 ) present an interview-based conjoint analysis on how university researchers and firm managers see the terms of collaborations agreements given ownership, publication, liability and remuneration. They find that both sides agree that publications should have consent from the firms and that requirements for confidentiality have priority over publication. In our study, there is a legal requirement that we do not contact any party. Thus, we lack qualitative data, aside from the contract terms. Interviews with project participants before and after the negotiations and at the end of the projects, together with an analysis of the contractual terms, would give a better understanding.
We have studied a sample of Norwegian collaborative research agreements. Norway is a small country within the European Economic Area with contract law based on Scandinavian civil law. We look forward to comparable studies from other countries.
Conclusion
We are still surprised, but less confused. We found that trade secrets and lead time advantage, the appropriation mechanisms surveys show that most business managers prefer, are rarely agreed upon in collaborative research between universities and industry. We explained how lead time advantage is a composite comprising trade secrets. With our cross tabulations, we empirically showed different aspects of the projects where knowledge flow is restricted by trade secrets. We contribute to theory in that we connect the concept of incomplete contracts with the structure of the collaboration agreements, the appropriation mechanisms and the actual need for renegotiations. We also point to the balance needed between reproducibility and appropriability in the form of trade secrets.
We end with four propositions for research and innovation managers, as well as policymakers. Building on the elements of an entrepreneurial architecture from (Nelles & Vorley, 2010, p. 169 i) There must be a clear strategy for the university that they wish to balance normative and mandatory publication with a case by case reflection on the best appropriation mechanism for utilisation and the public good. ii)
The leadership (administration, directors, department heads, leading scientists, project manager) must understand the appropriation mechanisms that can be used, and actively promote balanced use of trade secrets. The leadership must consider their plan for utilisation of the research results combined with the need for reproducibility. iii)
The culture must recognise trade secrets as a critical mechanism for knowledge exchange with industry and with other universities. iv)
The system must include templates and agreements that allow trade secrets. As the understanding of the need for appropriability evolves, the agreements must arrange for renegotiation of the contracts with the industry partners.
